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Nicholas Kaldor was a progressive force in economics who made several major contributions, 
which are well covered by other contributors to this issue in his memory. Yet, like most fi rst genera-
tion Keynesians, he stayed within the paradigm of The Concluding Notes to the General Theory, in 
which Keynes claimed that provided the State intervened to manage the level of demand, the sup-
ply side of an economy could be left to the processes of perfect or imperfect competition, whereas 
Kalecki realised that oligopoly could infl uence both macroeconomic aggregates and policies. Like 
Keynes, he also assumed, with Ricardo, that trade was between different fi rms in different coun-
tries rather than recognising that capital already was multinational and that this could qualify both 
exchange rate changes such as that of the sterling in 1967 and his regional employment premium 
and selective employment tax. 
Keywords: Ricardo, Keynes, Kalecki, oligopoly, multinational capital, exchange rates
JEL classifi cation indices: A10, B10, F12, H11, N20, N90
Stuart Holland, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies Kőszeg, Hungary 
and Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Portugal. 
E-mail: sholland@fe.uc.pt  
38 STUART HOLLAND
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
MEETING KALDOR
I knew Nicky Kaldor well. He was full of humour, humanity, and immensely gen-
erous in intellectual terms to alternative points of view. It was not without reason 
that a Treasury wit, playing on Budapest, from which they came, referred to him 
as Buda and to his counterpart high-level adviser to the 1960s Labour govern-
ments, Thomas Balogh as Pest.
I first met him when he had been invited by Pierre Uri (1911–1992), a socialist 
and right hand of Jean Monnet, to a working group in Paris in 1966 on the im-
plications for both European Economic Community (EEC) and UK agriculture if 
there were to be a successful British application to join the European Community. 
Significantly, Nicky could not find anyone in the Treasury, where he was adviser 
to the then Chancellor Jim Callaghan, who knew more of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy than that it was a price support system rather than the production 
grants system of the UK. He therefore asked Thomas Balogh, who was advising 
Harold Wilson, and to whom I was an assistant, whether I could advise and ac-
company him on the trip to Paris. 
I did, preparing a paper for him, which submitted that the EEC could not man-
age a British deficiency payments, or production grants system, which imposed 
limits for agricultural support since, while the share of agriculture in the UK was 
only some 3% of GDP, in France, Germany, and Italy it was at or over a fifth. In 
the UK, the Ministry of Agriculture could evaluate the production potential of 
individual farms since it was only dealing with few tens of thousands of them. 
In the EEC, such evaluation would have involved millions of them. In 1966, the 
price levels for EEC support had not been agreed. They were to be so only in 
1968. However, the differences in principle were clear and the outcome of price 
support without production limits in the EEC predictable – wine lakes and Grain 
Mountains. 
Yet the outflow from agriculture in the Community already was dramatic, and 
on past and projected trends could reduce the share of the working population 
in agriculture within some 15 years to levels at which the Community could, in 
principle, adopt a production grants system, i.e. giving support for a limited out-
put if world prices fell below a given level. This was part of the basis on which, a 
decade later, I was able to gain the support of De Gaulle, through negotiation with 
his then Interior Minister Louis Joxe, for a second British application to join the 
EEC, combined with joint financial support for the sterling and franc zones and 
a European Technology Community in which the UK, with the EFTA countries 
which would be likely to follow her lead, plus other EEC member states, could 
share the costs of France’s extensive advanced technology projects which the 
French Ministry of Finance already had indicated to me could not be supported 
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without the risk of “grave social tensions”, and which were to transpire in May 
1968 (Holland 2015b).
It was generous of Nicky to take me with him to Paris. I suspect he paid the 
fare himself. On the flight from London, he insisted that I sit next to him and let 
me lead him through the arguments. Then thanking me warmly and saying that 
he could support them and would insist that I also spoke at the meeting. Yet when 
the meeting started and he was invited by Pierre Uri to give his views on the com-
patibility or otherwise of the two support systems, relapsed into something with 
which he felt far more at home – Ricardo’s principle on diminishing returns from 
marginal land. After some 45 to 50 minutes of expounding this, he then suggested 
that I relate it to the issue in hand. Which I did. Then, when the meeting ended, 
he not only thanked me warmly, but also pushed a wad of French francs into the 
breast pocket of my jacket insisting nonetheless that I spend them at a particular 
nightclub whose name, if I remember rightly, was the Crazy Horse, which I did.
However, if this recollection, with others, is altogether warm, a cooler evalua-
tion of Kaldorian economic policies as he advised and gained them in the 1960s 
nonetheless is merited. In particular, these stayed within the Keynesian paradigm 
of The Concluding Notes to the General Theory, in which Keynes claimed that 
provided the State intervened to manage the level of demand, the supply side of 
an economy could be left to the processes of perfect or imperfect competition. 
And, while a master of Ricardian economic theory like Keynes and other first 
generation Keynesians, he assumed, with Ricardo, that trade was between dif-
ferent firms in different countries rather than recognising that capital mobility in 
the form of foreign direct investment already meant that British firms were four 
times more multinational than those of leading competitors such as Germany or 
Japan, and that this profoundly qualified devaluation as a means of gaining export 
competitiveness.
In the 1960s, Labour governments to which they both were advisers, he and 
Thomas Balogh were strong advocates of devaluation. Despite being forbidden 
even to mention it by Harold Wilson, they did so either when together or by 
phone in Hungarian. Yet without realising, even if this was common at the time, 
that the multinational companies, which already dominated UK visible exports 
would not follow through the 1967 devaluation with lower prices in foreign mar-
kets since this would be to compete against themselves abroad. His Selective 
Employment Tax (SET) aiming to discourage services and promote manufactur-
ing had limited effect since big business was not influenced by fiscal policy in its 
investment decision-making since it could largely self-finance investment from 
retained earnings. His Regional Employment Premium (REP) assumed different 
firms in different regions, and that they would thereby gain a regional “devalu-
ation” increasing their competitiveness, which was compromised for the same 
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reason. More significantly, he therefore did not deploy his great intellect to fol-
low Kalecki in recognising the degree to which oligopolistic enterprise could 
compromise a Keynesian micro-macro synthesis.
THE RICARDIAN PALL
In his Glasgow Lectures of 1763, Adam Smith advised that, if trade were freed 
from the constraints of taxes, tariffs and “the costs of carriage”,  
“The cotton and other commodities from China would undersell any made with us, 
were it not for the long carriage, and other taxes that are laid upon them” (Smith 
1763: 141–142). 
Smith also had observed in the same lectures that a key restraint on China 
gaining this advantage was that it was “inward looking”. Whereas now, for dec-
ades, it has been encouraging inwards investment, and the low cost of what it can 
produce is out competing much to most of the rest of the world in many manu-
factures, not least since European, US, Japanese, and Taiwanese companies have 
been producing in and exporting from China (McKinsey 2010).
By contrast with Smith’s recognition of what amounted to absolute advantage 
in trade, Ricardo (1817) submitted that if an economy were more efficient than 
others in all production, it would be comparatively more efficient in some prod-
ucts and to its advantage to specialise exports in them. Thus, as well known, he 
claimed that it would pay English exporters to specialise in cloth and Portuguese 
exporters to specialise in wine.  
Yet this displaced that it is not countries that decide how to specialise – or 
diversify – in trade, but companies. Moreover, Ricardo’s claim was a grand de-
ceit. For he admitted that such trade only would be to the reciprocal advantage of 
Portugal and England if there were no capital mobility, since otherwise English 
capitalists would prefer to make both wine and cloth in Portugal, where wages 
were significantly lower at the time, as they still are. As he put it,
“Under such circumstances capital moves from one country to another [and] the 
wine and cloth should be made in Portugal” (Ricardo 1817, part VII: 136).
He then simply asserted that capital mobility was unlikely to occur, claiming 
that,
“Experience, however, shews, that the fancied or real insecurity of capital, when 
not under the immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclina-
tion which every man has to quit the country of his birth and connexions, and 
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intrust himself, with all his habits fixed, to a strange government and new laws, 
checks the emigration of capital” (Ricardo ibid: 136–137). 
But “experience” showed nothing of the kind. It was investment by the British 
and Dutch East India companies that had been the foundations of the fortunes that 
Ricardo and his family made on the Amsterdam and London stock markets after 
they had left Portugal. 
Ricardo also chose to displace that it was English capital that already had in-
vested in and developed the Portuguese wine trade, controlling its whole value 
chain from vineyards, production, and shipping through to final sale. This was es-
pecially in port, which was the wine of choice for the English upper middle class 
at a time when gin, which could be locally produced, was deemed the downfall of 
the working class. English brand names still dominate most port on international 
markets such as Churchill, Croft, Dow, Gilbey, Graham, Offley, Taylor, or Warr. 
The trade in port and other Portuguese wines in Ricardo’s time therefore was 
not an example of comparative advantage with no capital mobility, but evidence 
of foreign direct investment by nascent British multinational capital. Which, a 
century and a half later, was fully fledged. Thus, by the 1960s, the value of pro-
duction outside the UK by British firms was more than double visible exports 
while, for key competitors such as Germany and Japan, it was less than 40% 
(Holland 1975). Which compromised not only the devaluation that Kaldor and 
Balogh espoused, but also the REP and SET.
QUALIFICATION OF THE 1967 STERLING DEVALUATION
Two analyses in the 1970s of the effects of the 1967 sterling devaluation, includ-
ing a study of the top 220 exporters which accounted for two-thirds of UK visible 
exports, found that none of them had chosen to lower export prices because of 
the devaluation, and that where some of them had done so, this had been for other 
reasons such as oligopolistic price strategies either to gain foreign market entry 
or to deter new entrants (Hague et al.1974; Holmes 1978). 
The authors of the reports were perplexed that such firms apparently were not 
interested in profit maximisation. They neglected that all of the top 220 exporting 
from the UK already were multinational companies and that to follow through the 
1967 sterling devaluation with lower prices in other markets would have been to 
compete against themselves abroad and reduce global profits. 
This is not to claim that exchange rate changes are unimportant. They are vital 
for countries with little foreign direct investment, and denying devaluation as 
a means of adjusting trade imbalances has been a critical disadvantage for the 
economies of peripheral Europe (Varoufakis – Holland 2011). But the effects are 
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asymmetric. A revaluation or re-appreciation of a currency will tend to reduce ex-
port competitiveness. But a devaluation of it for an economy with a high degree 
of outward foreign direct investment will not necessarily increase it (Holland 
1975, 1987b, 2015a).
Nor is the case to claim that either Kaldor or Balogh were wrong to argue for 
the devaluation of sterling in the 1960s. Nor were they alone among first genera-
tion Keynesians. But not for the reasons that they gave in terms of anticipating 
an increase in the competitiveness of “British” firms. Harold Wilson also was 
wrong on this. He had opposed devaluation when sterling was under pressure 
in mid-1966 not because he lacked any knowledge of Keynesian economics, 
but because he had given assurances that sterling would not be devalued and 
put his personal reputation beyond recognition that a devaluation in July that 
year would be preferable to the deflationary package, which both undermined 
confidence in the government and destroyed the expansionary expectations of 
the 1965 National Plan. 
COMPROMISE OF THE REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT PREMIUM
The multinational trend of British capital also qualified REP. Introduced in 1967, 
this was supposed to amount to a regional devaluation for the UK Development 
Areas, enabling them to compete more effectively with those, which already were 
more developed. Moore et al. (1986) calculate that in 1971, 63,000 jobs were be-
ing supported by REP and that, of these, about a third (in some 240 firms) were 
new locations in the Development Areas. But that of policy induced net job gains 
in development areas, only 16% were due to REP, with industrial development 
certificates (IDCs), which had been introduced by the post-war Labour govern-
ment, being far more significant. IDCs meant that no firms could expand invest-
ment for more than 15,000 square feet in the South East. Estimates suggest that 
they had induced firms to provide 89,000 jobs in the Development areas by 1971. 
IDCs were by far the most cost-effective measure (in treasury terms) since they 
included advance factory construction in the regions and minor incentives, but no 
ongoing cash subsidy. By contrast, REP was the most expensive of all regional 
development incentives in terms of cost per job. 
Yet, like the 40% regional investment grants offered by the 1960s Labour gov-
ernments, they were of little interest to UK multinational firms. In 1973, when I 
was adviser to a Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee of the House of 
Commons, I persuaded it to take evidence on the effectiveness of regional devel-
opment incentives from some 70 of the top manufacturing firms in the UK, all 
of which were multinationals. While some of them had gone to less developed 
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regions in the UK, none of them admitted that this had been because of either the 
Regional Employment Premium of the 40% investment grants.
When asked with some exasperation why not by the then chair of the Commit-
tee, Bill Rodgers, the head of a leading electronics multinational replied that his 
company, like others, already was investing in Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Philip-
pines, Mexico, and Brazil, where the cost of labour was a tenth or less than that 
of UK labour, and that labour could constitute 40% or more of total costs, with 
which the Regional Employment Premium could not compete (HoC 1973–1974). 
While, with some relevance now to the prospect that a Brexit may cause devolu-
tion in Scotland, John Firn, who later became director of the Scottish Develop-
ment Corporation in the 1970s, reported to the Committee that of the 105 top 
companies in Scotland at the time, 100 were multinationals (Firn 1973–1974).
DISPLACEMENT IN THE SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT TAX
From the onset of the 1964 Labour government, Kaldor advised that a general 
sales or Value Added Tax (VAT) should be used to replace flat-rate social security 
contributions. Officials were, however, generally hostile to VAT, believing that 
it would entail great administrative difficulty. Jim Callaghan’s response in April 
1966 was a Selective Employment Tax (SET). This aimed to shift labour from 
service industries with low productivity into higher productivity sectors such as 
manufacturing. 
The policy was designed to support exports, particularly in the context of de-
valuation. In addition, it was believed that the service sector, and in particular the 
retail sector, was using “excessive” labour (1973). A government commissioned 
evaluation of it by Reddaway was generally favourable, arguing that the reduc-
tion in employment in the retail sector had led to an improvement in productivity. 
Nevertheless, independent research did not support this result rather than that 
there were no obvious increases in productivity in manufacturing (Broadberry 
– Leunig 2013). A National Institute of Economic and Social Research analysis 
(Price 1978) also estimated its effect on exports to be virtually zero. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is clear that SET suffered from the same displacement by 
the first generation of Keynesians of the dual dimensions of oligopoly and the 
multinational trend of leading British firms or foreign firms located in the UK. 
SET was eventually abolished in 1971 by the Heath government.
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KEYNES, KALECKI, AND KALDOR
Oligopoly also means that smaller national exporters will not necessarily follow 
through devaluation in foreign markets. If they were to do so by charging lower 
prices in them, they would be competing against bigger multinational business 
already located there and could invite retaliatory “no entry” or “elimination” pric-
ing by which such firms could lower price to a point at which their micro chal-
lengers could not even meet their current variable costs, i.e. pay suppliers or even 
wages (Sylos-Labini 1968; Holland 1987a).
This was part of a general neglect both by Keynes and among first generation 
Keynesians of oligopoly and, with it, the stress laid on this by Kalecki (1943, 
1954), who was influenced by Marx, whereas Keynes was not. Kalecki recog-
nised that the oligopoly power of a few firms on the supply side of the economy 
could influence macroeconomic outcomes, which Keynes never did. He also re-
alised that Keynesian full employment could increase the power of organised 
labour, and with it possible inflationary pressures, which Keynes had recognised. 
But he anticipated also that full employment would change the relations of power 
between capital, labour and the State. As he put it,
“The assumption that a government will maintain full employment in a capitalist 
economy if it only knows how to do it is fallacious. In this connection the mis-
givings of big business about maintenance of full employment are of paramount 
importance” (Kalecki 1943: 144). 
 Kalecki added that opposition to this from big business and profit-seeking 
rentiers – disagreeing with Keynes’ presumption that their disappearance with 
full employment would be inevitable – could prevent governments in the longer 
term from sustaining full employment. Adding that even higher profits with full 
employment would neither necessarily change their view, nor their opposition 
to policies for redistribution, since this would imply a change in the balance of 
power from themselves towards governments and the institutions of civil society. 
Moreover, he also presciently submitted that the vested interests of big business
“…would find more than one economist to declare that the [full employment] situ-
ation is manifestly unsound. The pressure of all these forces, and in particular of 
big business would most probably induce government to the orthodox policy of 
cutting down the budget deficit” (Kalecki ibid).
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SUMMARY
None of the above is to neglect where Kaldor and the first generation Keynesians 
were right. They stressed the vital importance of effective demand to offset reces-
sion or depression and to raise both economies and societies to higher levels of 
employment, income, and welfare. Also, the need for effective taxation as well 
as capital controls.
Kaldor also was more right than Keynes in being concerned with dispropor-
tion between sectors and more concerned than him also with uneven develop-
ment. His attacks on equilibrium assumptions in macroeconomic theory (Kaldor 
1934, 1972, 1979) were notable. For change is not realistically captured by com-
parisons of static equilibria – transition from one equilibrium state to another 
– as by Samuelson (1947) in his influential Foundations of Economics, nor by 
John Hicks (1965) in his Capital and Growth, both of which assumed “neutral” 
technical progress which denies the asymmetric outcomes from innovations that 
Schumpeter (1934) had seen as raising economies and societies to higher levels 
of income and welfare. 
Yet he remained dependent, as had Keynes, on the Ricardian assumption that 
trade was between different firms in different countries, which qualified his case 
both for devaluation of a national currency such as that of the UK, and his case for 
REP as a means of increasing the competitiveness of UK regions. In staying with 
Keynes’ presumption that the supply side of the economy can be left to perfect 
and imperfect competition, he did not follow through Kalecki or Sylos- Labini 
in recognising the degree to which oligopoly can dominate macroeconomic out-
comes and qualify the scope for market entry of smaller micro firms. Nor that 
development could need not only the State managing the level of demand or cre-
ating the conditions for private sector firm creation, but also State entrepreneur-
ship, as was to be a key element of the policies of the Labour Party in the 1970s 
with the creation of a British National Oil Corporation, a National Enterprise 
Board, and Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Development Agencies.
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